



Several batches of denatured rapeseed oil caused a 
mass poisoning that sparked a huge scandal in Spain 
in the early 1980s. As related by the court-specialist 
journalist José Yoldi (2004), the deception consisted 
of a group of unscrupulous businessmen who bought 
very cheap rapeseed oil in France and sold it in 
Spain as sunflower or olive 
oil. Because of the Spanish oil 
surplus, legislation only allowed 
rapeseed oil importation for 
industrial applications, and so 
in France they added aniline, a 
toxic product that also dyes the 
oil blue. In order to remove it, 
the businessmen subjected the 
oil to a high-temperature refining 
process that transformed the 
anilines into fatty acid anilides, 
which are very toxic. 
The first death was recorded on 7 May 1981, an 
eight-year-old from Torrejón de Ardoz (Madrid, 
Spain). The trickle of victims started to follow, with 
daily news in the media about the toxic syndrome 
that allegedly caused atypical pneumonia leading, in 
many cases, to death or to serious consequences such 
as paralysis and muscle atrophy. Due to unspecific 
nature of the symptoms, the wide spread of cases 
across the country (Madrid, Castilla-La Mancha, 
Castilla y León, Asturias, Galicia and the Basque 
Country) and the difficulty in finding the cause – a 
lot of people thought they were consuming olive or 
sunflower oil because of the way the product was 
labelled – the administration decided to stay silent, 
which contributed to increased public concern. 
The crisis peaked on 21 May 1981, when the 
Minister of Work, Health and Social Security at 
the time, Jesús Sancho Rof, 
of the ruling UCD (Union of 
the Democratic Centre) party, 
appeared in front of cameras and 
uttered the legendary sentence 
claiming that the mass poisoning 
was caused by «a bug so small 
that it would die if it fell from a 
table». In this case, the Health 
Minister’s statement increased 
the population’s alarm and 
confusion. As reflected in the 
press coverage of the time (El País, 1981), rumour 
had it that bacteriological weapons had contaminated 
some fruits and vegetables which was causing the 
epidemic. Moreover, the first victim appeared near the 
United States military base in Torrejón, which helped 
to perpetuate this falsehood. The North American 
embassy had to deny that there were weapons of this 
type in Spanish territory and the sales of fruit and 
vegetables plummeted. 
HOW TO LEARN FROM OUR MISTAKES
COMMUNICATION OF HEALTH CRISES
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Reviewing public communications emitted during health crises in the last thirty years is useful for 
verifying that there are a number of repeated mistakes: for example, untrained spokespeople with 
poor communication skills, ambiguous messages, lack of communication plans for the crisis, and 
improvisation, which ends up with the transmission of alarming messages to the population and 
contributes to administrations being considered suspicious or untrustworthy by the people. The 
denatured rapeseed oil scandal, mad cow disease, influenza A virus, or the recent Ebola outbreak are 
clear examples of how not to communicate and offer us an opportunity to learn valuable lessons 
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On 9 June 1981, it was confirmed that denatured 
rapeseed oil was responsible and the General Director 
of Public Health at the time, Luis Valenciano, offered 
the first findings. These were confirmed in a very 
strange way: in cloistered convents, where nuns were 
using the supposed olive oil for ill sisters – who ended 
up intoxicated – but a different oil for the rest of the 
congregation, who were fine (El País, 1987). 
The relatives of the deceased and the over 20,000 
affected people initiated legal action that dragged on 
for over a quarter of a century (El médico interactivo, 
2003). Many of their demands were not met and they 
are still demanding adequate treatment. The only 
positive aspect of this unfortunate story is that it laid 
the foundations for an epidemiological surveillance 
system to prevent similar events from happening again. 
n  MAD	COW	DISEASE,	THE	MINISTER	AND	THE	
BONES	FOR	BROTH
The next case occurred in the mid-1990s. The mad 
cow disease (also known as bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy) jumped into headlines in 1996, when 
the first case of a human affected by Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease, related to consumption of infected beef, 
appeared. The first case in animals had been detected 
eleven years before. Animals had been fed with scrapie, 
the crushed remains of brains, soft tissue and bones 
from sheep and goats, which caused prions – a protein 
that is also an infectious agent – to infect animals, 
which then jumped over to humans.
Most of infections happened in the United Kingdom, 
but the trickle of cases was relentless in the late 1990s. 
Infected animals, or animals suspected of having been 
fed scrapie, started to be sacrificed. The first Spanish 
case appeared in November 2000, when the European 
Union started to ban the consumption of certain 
animal-based food products under the suspicion that 
they might cause the disease. The Minister of Health at 
the time, Celia Villalobos, contributed to the confusion 
with outlandish, poorly thought-out statements, like 
claiming it was «a problem of animal health» (El 
Mundo, 2001). The peak of the crisis arrived on 8 
January 2001, when, in a radio interview, the Minister 
recommended housewives not to use beef bones to 
make broth, saying that «…they are not sold anymore, 
use pork [bones] instead» (Sampedro, 2001). The meat 
industry’s reaction was devastating; they expressed 
disappointment at the social alarm caused by the 
Minister’s statements, and described them as nonsense. 
Eventually, the role the veterinarian Juan José Badiola 
played as a spokesperson in the crisis provided the 
calm required and contributed to finally reaching the 
public with reassuring messages. Villalobos resigned a 
year and a half later, on 10 July 2002. 
In total, 224 primary cases (five of them in Spain) 
and three secondary cases (because of transfusions) 
were diagnosed in humans (University of Edinburgh, 
2012), and millions of animals were sacrificed (Meikle, 
2012), most of them in the United Kingdom. Livestock 
restrictions lasted for over a decade.
n  INFLUENZA	A,	WRONG	MESSAGES	FROM	THE	
WORLD	HEALTH	ORGANIZATION
On 11 June 2009, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) categorised the influenza A epidemic (H1N1) 
as a phase 6 pandemic (World Health Organization, 
2009). In March the press had already extensively 
covered the first cases of this swine flu that had 
mutated and started infecting humans. When the first 
death occurred in April, media interest increased, and 
their coverage peaked when WHO communications 
caused global mass hysteria: their calculations 
projected up to 150 million dead. Around 19,000 
people eventually died (Efe, 2010), about 400 of them 
in Spain, whereas seasonal flu causes around 250,000 



















The General Secretary of the Ministry of Health at 
the time, José Martínez Olmos, published a book in 
2014 in which he reviewed the experience. Despite the 
fact that experts expected the disease to have a high 
incidence, the vaccine purchase in Spain for 20 % of 
the population was «prudent», while other countries 
chose to buy doses for every citizen (Martínez Olmos, 
2014). Finally, the expenditure – 300 million euros in 
Spain – proved to be useless and six million vaccines 
had to be destroyed (Abc, 2014). 
According to Martínez Olmos, the WHO’s 
communication was bad, with excessive alerts 
– especially the sentence of their Director-General, 
Margaret Chan, stating that all humanity was under 
threat – that reached international organisations 
through unofficial channels like the press or social 
networks (Caylá, 2009) and which caused huge 
spending around the globe. Another criticised aspect 
was the poor coordination between European countries, 
which missed the opportunity to make a centralised 
purchase of vaccines. This caused countries such as 
Poland to have no vaccine, which could have led to a 
very serious health problem had the epidemic turned 
out to have been more aggressive. 
n EBOLA,	AN	INSTITUTIONAL	MESS
Perhaps the most unfortunate case in recent times was 
communication management during the case of Teresa 
Romero, the Spanish nursing assistant infected with 
Ebola after treating the missionary Manuel García 
Viejo, who had been infected in Africa. Thus, in 
October 2014 Spain became the first country with a 
case of infection outside the African continent. The 
National Association of Health Journalists (Asociación 
Nacional de Informadores de la Salud; ANIS) analysed 
the many mistakes made during their Xi conference in 
April 2015, and provided a number of examples of how 
not to communicate (ANIS, 2015).
The patient, upon feeling the first symptoms, went 
to her family doctor, who sent her back home. Her 
condition started to worsen, so she went to the Alcorcón 
Foundation University Hospital in Madrid, where a 
blood analysis confirmed the Ebola diagnosis on 6 
October 2014. The result of the test quickly leaked to 
the press and the doctor who treated her learned about it 
when he turned on the TV to watch the afternoon news.
However, the event that started the crisis was 
the Ministry of Health’s press conference at eight 
o’clock that evening, with verbal and non-verbal 
communication that transmitted fear and concern to the 
population. The press conference started half an hour 
late because they could not find the key to the sound 
table room, and this sparked an argument between 
the different Ministry officials and further increased 
tension and nervousness. Despite Spain having a crisis 
plan and an action protocol to fight pandemics (that 
was created after the influenza A crisis and could have 
easily been adapted), it was not used. Furthermore, 
the format of the conference, with seven speakers 
with nothing to say, contributed to building a panic 
scenario, reflected in social media with the hashtag 
#vamosamorirtodos [we are all going to die]. 
In contrast, the communication team at the La Paz-
Carlos III University Hospital where Teresa Romero 

























reassuring the population and avoided raising the alarm 
(Rodríguez Andrés, 2011), by regularly giving media 
press-conferences. A Whatsapp group was even created 
so that any journalist interested could receive the 
updates and news from the press office.
Meanwhile, Madrid’s regional government and the 
Ministry of Health kept passing the buck to each other, 
and even organised press conferences at almost the 
same time as each other but then cancelled them, which 
puzzled journalists even more. We can find another 
example of poor communication from an institutional 
spokesperson in an offensive statement given by the 
regional government’s health advisor, Javier Rodríguez, 
which finally forced him to resign.
 The sensationalism of the 
media deserves a special mention 
as well. On the one hand, because 
of the way they covered the news 
that Excalibur, the patient’s dog, 
had to be sacrificed because of the 
suspicion he had also been infected 
with Ebola; on the other hand, 
journalists and pundits with no 
healthcare training or knowledge 
of the issue debated for hours about 
whether the viral infection occurred 
because of an infected glove. 
The list of mistakes was enormous. Once the name 
of the patient leaked, her mother, who lived in a 
Galician village in the province of Lugo, in the north 
of Spain, was harassed. Another of these mistakes was 
that obituaries were prepared in advance – because it 
was assumed that the patient would die imminently – 
and were published by mistake on several national 
media websites, including COPE (who later denied it on 
Twitter) or Elcorreo.com (who repeated news agency 
information). The newspaper El Mundo also published 
an op-ed by Santiago González titled Un país algo raro 
(“Quite an unusual country”), which described the event 
as «the imminent death» (González, 2014).
ANIS published an announcement (ANIS, 2014a) 
asking healthcare officials to offer as much information 
as possible with complete transparency and veracity, 
to avoid rumours and contradictory messages, to 
provide adequate expert voices, to respect the privacy 
of the patient, her family and environment, and to 
listen to their health communication experts. In 
addition, they asked the media to offer rigorous and 
verified information, to avoid unfounded rumours and 
speculation, to select expert sources as communicators, 
to respect the privacy of those affected, and to put 
healthcare professionals in charge of the information 
during the crisis.
In these troubled times, charlatans of all kinds 
emerged trying to sell their magical remedies to cure 
Ebola with rectal ozone therapy, sea water, oregano oil, 
medicinal herbs or harmful chlorine by-products. A 
helpful article in El País reported the situation (Salas, 
2014). Another example of great journalism was Carlos 
Alsina’s monologue on the radio station Onda Cero, 
titled Historia de este brote de ébola (“The history of 
this Ebola outbreak”) (Alsina, 2014).
After four days of confusion, on Friday 10 October 
the Vice-President of the Spanish Government, Soraya 
Sáenz de Santamaría, took control of the crisis and 
named Fernando Simón, an expert on the issue and not 
a politician, as the spokesperson 
for the special committee. His 
composure, knowledge and 
cautious messages contributed 
to appeasing both the press and 
the public. However, mistakes 
continued from the journalistic 
point of view, with a cover of El 
Periódico de Cataluña on 10 
October in which the patient could 
be seen in her hospital room. 
The picture was a screenshot 
taken from a monitor watching 
the patient, and its use was even 
justified by the newspaper’s director (Hernández, 2014). 
Several paparazzi took photographs of the patient’s 
room from the building across the street from the 
hospital, which ended up on newspaper covers such 
as that of Abc on 12 October. To prevent the press 
from taking more photographs, the shutters on Teresa 
Romero’s room were lowered, a decision which was 
criticised by her healthcare professionals, because it 
made their work more difficult. Other media such as El 
«PERHAPS THE MOST 
UNFORTUNATE CASE 
IN RECENT TIMES 
WAS COMMUNICATION 
MANAGEMENT DURING THE 
CASE OF TERESA ROMERO, 











País, published pictures online, but then had to remove 
them and subsequently apologise.  
On 13 October, ANIS published a second 
announcement, regretting the appearance of these 
pictures «without her consent and with the pictures 
being unnecessary for providing information about 
the process, as they bring no new information and 
violate the patient’s right to privacy. Nothing justifies 
the dissemination of these pictures, which threaten the 
nursing assistant’s privacy, as well as the privacy of the 
professionals who take care of her» (ANIS, 2014b).  
The announcement also insisted that journalists must 
know that the right to privacy prevails over the right 
to information in our legal system: in the year 2000 
the Constitutional Court was very emphatic on the 
limits of the right of information regarding individual’s 
private lives. ANIS’s statement was based on the fact 
that the fundamental right to privacy recognised by 
Article 18.1 of the Constitution tries to guarantee an 
area of individuals’ lives related to respect for their 
dignity as a person and protect them against the action 
and knowledge of others. For this reason, no one can 
be required to passively bear the disclosure of real or 
alleged information about their private, personal or 
family life.
The last episode in this shameful communication 
crisis was the proliferation of hoaxes on social 
networks, with fake screenshots from prestigious 
media outlets informing readers about a second Ebola 
outbreak (sic) in a hospital in Denia (Spain), that the 
first victim had been registered in the Vallecas district 
in Madrid or that the maximum state of alert had been 
decreed in south Madrid and in the district of El Pilar, 
which were controlled by the army. 
If we do not change the way we act, we will live 
through more phenomena of this kind. For instance, 
only this year, the WHO’s communication policy was 
once again questioned because of ambiguous messages 
on the matter of processed red meat and its connection 
to cancer. The specialisation of the press and, above all, 
putting common sense and rigour over sensationalism 
are the solutions required to prevent errors like these in 
the future.  
REFERENCES
Abc. (2014, 1 October). Martínez Olmos: «La OMS tiene que rendir cuentas 
de la gestión de la gripe A». Abc. Retrieved from http://www.abc.es/ 
sociedad/20141001/abci-martinez-olmos-tiene-rendir-201409302148.html
Alsina, C. (2014, 14 October). Historia de este brote de ébola. Onda Cero: El 
monólogo de Alsina [Audio Podcast]. Retrieved from http://blogs.ondacero. 
es/alsina/historia-este-brote-ebola_2014101300315.html
Ambrojo, J. C. (2010, 13 de February. ¿Qué pasó con la gripe A? El País. 
Retrieved from http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2010/02/13/actualidad/ 
1266015601_850215.html
Asociación Nacional de Informadores de la Salud (2014a, 8 October). 
Comunicado de ANIS con motivo de la crisis del ébola en España. Retrieved 
from http://www.anisalud.com/es/actualidad/noticias-anis/comunicado-de-
anis-con-motivo-de-la-crisis-del-ebola-en-espana
Asociación Nacional de Informadores de la Salud. (2014b, 13 October). 
Comunicado de ANIS con motivo de la crisis del ébola en España. Retrieved 
from http://www.anisalud.com/es/actualidad/noticias-anis/comunicado-de-
anis
Asociación Nacional de Informadores de la Salud. (2015, 10-12 April). XI 
Congreso ANIS – Debate sobre la gestión de la crisis del Ébola [vídeo]. 
Oviedo. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJ_XUfDJmnQ
Caylá, J. A. (2009). Epidemias mediáticas, una reflexión para la salud pública. 
Gaceta Sanitaria, 23(5), 362–364. doi: 10.1016/j.gaceta.2009.09.002
Efe. (2010, 10 August). La OMS anuncia el fin de la pandemia de la gripe A. 
Efe. Retrieved from http://web.archive.org/web/20100815092520/http://www.
google.com/hostednews/epa/article/ALeqM5gru2hHaWKFOq5W3vj3-QyaU-
Zl8g
El médico interactivo. (2003, 10 January). Historia y evolución del síndrome 
del aceite tóxico (S.A.T.). El médico interactivo. Retrieved from http://www.
elmedicointeractivo.com/ap1/emiold/biblio/rbcn45.htm
El Mundo. (2001, 9 January). Las frases de Celia Villalobos. El 
Mundo. Retrieved from http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2001/01/09/
sociedad/979044100.html
El País. (1981, 22 May). Se desconoce aún el origen de la epidemia de 
neumonía atípica. El País. Retrieved from http://elpais.com/hemeroteca/ 
elpais/portadas/1981/05/22
El País. (1987, 13 March). La ensalada de las monjas. El País. Retrieved from 
http://elpais.com/diario/1987/03/13/espana/542588407_850215.html
González, S. (2014, 10 October). Un país algo raro. El Mundo.
Hernández, E. (2014, 10 October). Cinco razones para publicar la fotografía 
de Teresa Romero. El Periódico de Cataluña. Retrieved from http://www.
elperiodico.com/es/noticias/opinion/cinco-razones-para-publicar-fotografia-
teresa-romero-contagiada-ebola-hospital-carlos-madrid-3590271
Martínez Olmos, J. (2014). ¿Qué pasó con la gripe A? Retrieved from http://
www.quepasoconlagripea.com
Meikle, J. (2012, 25 April). Mad cow disease – a very British response to an 
international crisis. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.
com/uk/2012/apr/25/mad-cow-disease-british-crisis
Rodríguez Andrés, R. (2011). La efectividad del uso del miedo como factor 
persuasivo en la comunicación de riesgos en las crisis sanitarias. Revista de 
Comunicación y Salud, 1(2), 33–46.
Salas, J. (2014, 8 October). Los charlatanes del ébola. El País. Retrieved from 
http://elpais.com/elpais/2014/10/08/ciencia/1412761885_930208.html
Sampedro, J. (2001, 9 January). Villalobos desaconseja el consumo de caldo 
de vaca. El País. Retrieved from http://elpais.com/diario/2001/01/09/ 
sociedad/978994806_850215.html
University of Edinburgh. (2012). Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease 
current data (July 2012). Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/
web/20120721234746/http://www.cjd.ed.ac.uk/vcjdworld.htm
World Health Organization. (2009). El nivel de alerta de pandemia de 
gripe se eleva de la fase 5 a la fase 6. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_pandemic_phase6_20090611/es
Yoldi, J. (2014). Peor habría sido tener que trabajar. Madrid: Libros.com 
Javier Granda Revilla. Freelance journalist specialising in health. He is the 
Vice-President of the National Association of Health Journalists (ANIS), Spain, 
which awarded him the prize for best communication work in 2014. He is also 
a member of the Spanish Association of Scientific Communication (AECC) 
and the Association of Biotechnology Communicators (ACB). He is Professor 
in Scientific Communication for the Master’s Degree at the Pharmaceutical 
Industry Scientific Departments (ESAME Foundation – University of 
Barcelona). He currently collaborates with the science supplement «BigVang» 
at La Vanguardia, the health supplements of the El País, La Razón, and Diario 
Médico, and the journal El Médico.
